Correct. Fuel is around 16/36th of the CO2 mass it emit when being burnt. A 777 carries around 120 tons of fuel for a SF/LON flight, so that's around 300 tons of emissions per flight.
There is a ballistic chute on the cirrus SF50 (their single-engine jet). It's a 7 seater IIRC (6 minimum), and roughly the same weight (2.7T for the cirrus, 3.1 for the lilium).
This type of antiscientific/clickbait reporting shouldn't be on HN. ITER (whatever you think of its results, its competition with more modern approaches like commonwealth fusion systems, and fusion in general) has never been designed for, and has never claimed net-positive power production. It's a prototype vessel for research.
Thats not exactly right. It’s simply that you cannot sell something built >51% by the factory under experimental rules, you’d need to have it FAA certified which this isn’t ( for thousands of reasons ).
The 51% rule is extremely common in experimental aviation.
Transoceanic aircraft need lots of ETOPS time. For example the boeing 777 (twin-engine, transoceanic) has an ETOPS of 330 minutes, so it always needs to be 330 min away from an airport (which is 11 hours of flight from airport A to airport B, not taking wind into account)
Yeah agreed, even on the GA market, the eFlyer 2 is a much more aerodynamic design (low wing, wheel pants, lower windshield height) which is already claiming 36kW cruise at 100kts.
I'm surprised nobody talked about the potential implications of effectively embedding, now that the device is standalone, a lithium ion battery into your skull.
I'm not a battery hater whatsoever but in the case of a thermal runoff if the battery starts burning... there is no way to get it out.
Seems like a nightmare now that I think about it, like you get a ransomware popup beamed into your visual cortex saying:
"We are in your brain, wire the contents of your bank account to the following bitcoin adres: <adress>. If you do not comply, we will blow up your neuralink, if you try to alert anyone, we will blow up your neuralink. We are watching, you have 2 hours, good luck."
"it was rumored that hackers for big media companies had figured out a way to get through the defenses that were built into such systems, and run junk advertisements in your peripheral vision (or even spang in the ... middle all the time - even when your eyes were closed. Bud knew a guy like that who's somehow gotten infected with a meme that ran advertisements for roach motels, in Hindi, superimposed on the bottom right-hand corner of his visual field, twenty-four hours a day, until the guy whacked himself."
To be clear, I don't think this is a solution to either.
The entire reason why people suffer from anti-social behavior delivered through computers is that computers are a real part of our world at this point. Simply disengaging may not be an effective way of dealing with it.
Lithium ion is not one thing, one type of battery, but describes a very wide range of batteries. If you are willing to pay more and use more advanced materials for the difference parts of the battery, you can make it way secure.
We don't do that yet for cars as for the amount of batteries you need, it would make the car to expensive. However for medical devices, such batteries are already in us and with all the research into batteries today, this will improve even more.
I'm more concerned about my head being drilled open, metal put into my head and having a BLE connection. The battery is the least of my worries.
Yes, and that's why there are such high standards for medical devices.
In the presentation Elon specifically mentions their involvement with the FDA and highlighted their focus on safety (drawing a parallel with Tesla five star ratings)
those aren't super hornets by the way (no civilian would get an authorization to fly a super hornet). They're the A/B, original hornet version, and any superhornet would fly circles around one.
This is not true. Don't spread FUD. Apple does not have the ability to read your messages. All messages stored on their servers are encrypted with keys that live only on the phone.
iMessage doesn't store your decryption keys on Apple's servers unless you opt into iCloud backup which is a whole different service and security concern.
Most people use iCloud backup. Even if you don't, your messages are still sent to Apple by the recipient. And Apple prohibits third party backup services.
> Apple does not have the ability to read your messages.
iCloud backup is an Apple service and it has the ability to read most of your messages even if you don't use it, which makes this statement categorically false.
This is completely ridiculous. iMessage is encrypted by my device and remains encrypted until it gets to the recipient device. That is what end-to-end encryption means.
That I may have given Apple my private key through a different message in no way affects that end-to-end encryption, because it is trivial to decide not to give Apple that key.
iCloud isn't some separate entity from iMessage. It's all Apple. And you have no option to use a different cloud backup provider.
You can decide not to give your keys to Apple, but you can't decide for all your friends to not give their keys to Apple, and the result is the same: Apple can read your messages.
And the marketing is so misleading that hardly anyone knows that Apple can read most iMessages.
Sorry, let's be explicit here, as you seem intent on muddying the issue. Where, other than the endpoints, is the message decrypted when people use iMessage? Your succinct answer to that will clear this up for everyone.
On GCBD's servers in China. Possibly on Apple's servers in the US if they are running a wiretap. Due to the way key distribution works for iMessage, it is trivial for Apple and GCBD to do so.
Your message, through several layers of indirection, relies on a security conference paper from 7 years ago[0] + the assumption that Apple haven't updated the protocol in 7 those years.
No, my message relies on the fact that people have been looking at iMessage for years, and nobody, least of all Apple, has said that the implementation changed in any way to prevent Apple from viewing the messages.
Here is another article from 2016, which shows that Apple patched iMessage to prevent attackers who don't have access to Apple's servers from reading the messages but still kept the ability to read the messages themselves. https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/category/imessage/
Apple was aware that people knew it could decrypt iMessage messages this entire time, but Apple made no changes that would fix that. That should give you some idea of whether Apple intends to ever fix that.
Apple can, of course, do whatever it likes, up to simply recording the screen and sending that to weird & wonderful government agencies. Like almost everything in mainstream security, it comes down to who you trust. It doesn't mean it isn't E2E though.
E2E encryption simply means that messages are only decrypted at the endpoints. That certainly isn't true of iMessage in China, and it might not even be true for some users in the US — we have no way of knowing because the protocol makes no guarantee against it.
So basically the first and second parties themselves need to do all encryption and decryption without any help from the third party running the service. Which is the age old usability issue famously holding back the casual adoption of PGP. Hard enough with text... To do it with video conferencing would be quite the feat. Someday, though.
I have linked it several times in this thread. Here it is again:
"If you have iCloud Backup turned on, your backup includes a copy of the key protecting your Messages. This ensures you can recover your Messages if you lose access to iCloud Keychain and your trusted devices."
Only Apple can know exactly when or where or how often they decrypt people's messages from their backups, because once they have the keys they have the means to do it at any place and time, for any reason, without anyone's knowledge or consent.
What we know is that they can and do decrypt iMessages from iCloud backups in response to law enforcement requests[1]. This proves that they hold the keys, if their own support pages weren't enough evidence for you.
And even if none of that were the case, couldn't they just push out an update to the app or OS (just to the target, so other researchers debugging or watching traffic wouldn't know) which would cause the device to exfiltrate the cleartext anyway? Or always have had said feature?
"If you have iCloud Backup turned on, your backup includes a copy of the key protecting your Messages. This ensures you can recover your Messages if you lose access to iCloud Keychain and your trusted devices."
Let's not use sarcasm or sources..... Let's puzzle it out.
You don't use a password to encrypt your iCloud backups... They're specific to the hardware your backing up. If you have an itouch for example it's backups are separate from your phone.
So now you have these backups in the cloud and you lose your iPhone, you remote wipe it.
Now your new one arrives and you restore from backup... Your iMessage private keys are available to apple unencrypted .... Because you didn't need to provide a second factor of authentication for unlocking the backup you were just asked which one to use.
Apple and any reputable nation-state can read your iMessages with a subpoena ... If you use iCloud backups and not local backups with a password.
2) What about your iCloud account and password that are required to encrypt, store, access, and decrypt the backups there? Is that not a factor worth consideration?
Your password is not a factor worth considering. You can ask Apple to change it. That means they have the ability to change it. That means they have access.
This is both true and false. Apple stores keys on the device so they can't read your old messages, but say they want to start reading messages of a particular user, they can simply issue a new key and store it on the device and the server and start decrypting the new messages using it.
This is why WhatsApp for example notifies users when the key of the recipient changes, and they give you a way of verifying that the both keys at both ends are identical.
Tuxer said "keys," not "your decryption keys." Apple distributes the public keys that each party encrypts their message with, and they route the encrypted messages through their servers. They can trivially eavesdrop on conversations by simply providing a key from a key pair they generate to a participant and reencrypting messages using the other parties' public keys after deciphering the messages.
Yes, it does. The messages are 'end to end' encrypted in the iMessage service, but then iMessage backs up its encryption key in the iCloud backup service, defeating the point.
"If you have iCloud Backup turned on, your backup includes a copy of the key protecting your Messages. This ensures you can recover your Messages if you lose access to iCloud Keychain and your trusted devices."
That is true of any end-to-end solution. If you back up your private keys, anyone who has access to your backup would be able to access the encrypted messages. Remember, you can turn off iCloud backup if you're worried about Apple accessing your keys.
Ultimately, it's false to equate iMessage's encryption scheme, which is end-to-end, to an encryption scheme that requires a server to relay decrypted data.
Utterly false. Real end-to-end encryption would encrypt the backup with a key that is not available to the backup service (e.g. derived from a passphrase not sent to the server).
Of course this system has better usability, which is why Apple does it. But it's still a farce to call a system where Apple has the ability to decrypt the majority of messages "end-to-end" encrypted. The fact that it's through the backup servers instead of the iMessage servers makes no difference.
What's more, it's possible to do better without sacrificing usability. For several years Android has been end-to-end encrypting backups using the user's lock screen passcode, with protection against brute force attacks provided by hardware secure elements. https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/google-and-android-h...
> The fact that it's through the backup servers instead of the iMessage servers makes no difference.
It makes a big difference. If I print out the texts I receive, it doesn't change whether the texting program is end-to-end encrypted. The same goes for backups. An unencrypted system-level backup doesn't mean that the program being backed up is failing at security.
It's bad that Apple doesn't let you encrypt your backups properly, but it's a separate issue.
What if the texting program has a built in feature to print the texts you receive and mail a copy to the company that wrote the program, and it nags you to enable this feature all the time, and most of your friends have it enabled? Because that's a lot closer to the scenario here.
> An unencrypted system-level backup doesn't mean that the program being backed up is failing at security.
iOS programs can choose how their data is backed up. iMessage isn't just getting its data stolen by iCloud accidentally. These backups are a feature of iMessage as much as iCloud. And besides, iCloud is made by the same company, it's not a separate entity.
> Would you say that no desktop app that saves its key can ever qualify as end-to-end encrypted?
I would say that no app can qualify as end-to-end encrypted if a large fraction of users send their data to the maker of the app in a form that can be decrypted by the maker of the app, regardless of the reason.
Turning off iCloud backup is not a genuine choice, because it means you lose everything if you lose or break your phone (there is no other way to back up your phone except iCloud backup, Apple does not allow third-party phone backup services).
There’s a good HN thread from earlier this year about that, but basically, you can disable iCloud Backup and enable Messages in the Cloud, so that all of the messages are still backed up and synced between your devices but the keys are not, so that Apple can not read them. Then you can back up to your Mac/PC instead.
But most end-to-end encrypted apps aren't configured by most of their users to send their messages and encryption keys directly to the author of the app. iMessage is.
Feel free to trust who you want but I don't think Apple should be able to get away with calling iMessage end-to-end encrypted when they have most iMessages stored on their servers and the keys to decrypt them.
> At some point you have to trust somebody, right?
It's possible to use an actual end to end encrypted app that doesn't have the keys to read your messages stored on their servers.
I think this article is a bit over my head, but if Apple never has possession of users' private keys, how are they able to recover iMessage conversations when a phone is lost/stolen (which I know they can do)?
Interesting to note that counting rides by a bounded geographic area is going to miss a lot, as the caltrain data doesn't seem to be represented in the santa clara data.
Also, the Austin data doesn't take into account that the city regularly expands its geographic boundaries (typically east and west) which may artificially make it seem as if it is increasing riders when it is simply absorbing them.
Since the current expansion started in 2010, the San Francisco tech industry has more than quadrupled in size to 100,644 tech jobs as of year-end 2018.
