The general rule about "improving things a little is better than doing nothing" would philosophically require you to take a much broader view of the improvements you think you do and see if they affect other things causally. If you do that you quickly run into problems and things become much more complex. Yet thats what you do when you look at ethics.
For instance:
"Now instead of having no taxis at all, people can choose between an expensive taxi or no taxi at all – a marginal improvement. Needless to say, Uber has been repeatedly lambasted for doing something instead of leaving the even-worse status quo the way it was."
From the perspective of those who can afford surge pricing this is an improvement not for those who cant.
Uber is planning on making cars automated, thats great for the consumer but not for those driver who suddenly find themselves out of jobs. People who helped pay for ubers automation of their fleet.
The more correct "interpretation" is to not call it ethical or non-ethical. It's both correct and not correct.
In other words from an ethical point of view and to stay in the quantum theoretical jargon — it's not been observed.
I think you've correctly identified an alternate argument against surge pricing - "it's better to randomly distribute a smaller number of taxis than to allocate a larger number of taxis to people willing to pay more".
I've never actually seen anyone make that argument - instead, they simply make the Copenhagen critique described in the article. If you know of someone making it, could you link to them?
Matt Bruenig (who I generally recommend to anybody interested in questions of economic justice because his writing introduces laypeople to brilliant and refreshing points) has a series on Uber surge pricing where, among other things, he makes that precise argument.
He's the kind of guy who even includes (hints of) a sample calculation showing how the random distribution of a smaller number of taxis can lead to an objectively better outcome - it all depends on what your assumptions about people's utility functions are and what your objective function is.
He also argues why it is in many people's self-interest to argue against surge pricing (a point which is, admittedly, much more obvious: many people prefer a low chance of getting an affordable taxi over a zero chance of getting a taxi they cannot afford).
The problem with argument's like Bruenig's is that they double as fully-general counterarguments against the entire concept of a price system, and in favor of strict price controls. You could make his exact points against e.g. allowing some foods to be priced more than others, with the same points about "the poor value the food more, it would go to a random population rather than just the rich", etc.
There is too much wrong with that argument to point to any one thing, but suffice to say, even the most pro-poor nations reject it.
That's why every sane nutrition policy is more like "tax people, give the poor money to buy food" rather than "all food [appropriately quantified and defined] should be cheap enough for the poor to subsist on, and if you want to sell any food at all, you must sell it at that rate".
It's kind of amusing, because you are somewhat in line with what Bruenig writes, apparently without realizing it.
If you think that Bruenig is arguing for price controls without any qualifiers, you read the article wrong. He is arguing for equality, because equality is a necessary precondition if you actually want to get the full benefits of a price system (among other reasons). I have yet to see a convincing counterargument to that point.
You may have been misled by the part about the theory of the second best (which is a common point in economics): since the best solution (eliminating inequality) is off the table for political reasons, you have to turn to second-best solutions. Under certain circumstances, that can mean price controls.
But yes, the best solution is to eliminate (or at least reduce, as a first step) inequality. For example, taxing the rich and giving to the poor, as you point out yourself (which is where we're back at you agreeing with Bruenig ;-)).
His article didn't distinguish what conditions would justify price controls instead of subsidies, which is kind of critical, and they still "prove" that the poor would be better off if we just price-controlled all food, "since there's inequality, which makes them value a chance at the allocation a lot more".
And I never said (nor was given reason to think that) the best solution is to eliminate inequality, so I don't see how I'm agreeing with that. And I take that seriously because I mine every article for information that would force me to switch to a worldmodel with more explanatory power; this one (like most clumsy attempts to prove the pointlessness of prices) fails at that.
Taxing the rich for foodstamps is not eliminating inequality, and is not rightly regarded as a "first step" towards a policy that does; only a tiny fraction of foodstamp advocates want anything like the radical equality required for his model of this problem to apply.
I think there's a fairly general case to be made that moral intuitions that look like nonsense from a utilitarian perspective (1) may sometimes actually make sense when one takes a different view and (2) may have spread and prospered for exactly that reason (e.g., because communities in which such ideas were around did better overall).
In this case, the "different view" in question is a less local one (look not only at the effects on people directly involved, but also at the knock-on effects on others around them). I think there are many "Copenhagen" cases in which one could make similar points. E.g., consider laws that stop employers treating employees "badly" -- minimum wages, no making people work while heavily pregnant, etc. One can argue (as the author of the OP does) that these end up hurting workers because employers will prefer not to employ them rather than to employ them on less favourable terms. (Or, on the flip side, that "exploitative" employers are actually helping their employees because hey, otherwise they'd have no job.) But it's at least credible that when you have such laws, employers everywhere end up treating their workers a little better while more or less the same amount of work still gets done, leaving lots of vulnerable people better off overall. (And it's notable that it's at any rate far from clear that creating or increasing a minimum wage actually reduces employment overall, Econ 101 notwithstanding.)
The ideas being criticized by the OP may have more merit than they look like, even if most of the people espousing those ideas don't know quite why.
No I don't think I can. But I can point to plenty of people who would make that argument if you asked them.
However as I started out saying. My point isn't to say that one thing is better than another, just that you can't talk about ethics the way the essay tries to.
Cherry picking your "control groups" isn't how ethical discussions are being done. Instead pick the dilemma and then see how different solutions situations deal with it.
>If you know of someone making it, could you link to them?
Anybody talking about equality from a socialist standpoint, would implicitly accept this kind of argument, even if they haven't thought this idea of random distribution explicitly.
So why don't you actually make the explicit argument why random allocation of 100 cabs is better than market allocation of 150? Start by stating your first principles.
2) Providing privileged access to transporation to people with more wealth gives them an unfair advantage over other citizens.
3) Random allocation of 100 cabs is better than market allocation of 150.
Actually, come to think of it, the same is what happens with things like university placements in a lot of Western European countries. The richer don't buy their way in -- they are distrubuted randomnly among those with the qualifications.
(3) Random allocation of N cabs is better than market allocation of M > N. How do find an (N,M) for which the statement is false? Is a market allocation of 100 cabs worse than a random allocation of 0 cabs?
Actually making the moral argument is harder than just spouting applause points like "equality FTW".
1) Equality of access to whatever society / the world offers.
2) Unfair in this example means that something beneficial is given to some citizens over others just because they have more money -- as opposed to alternatives like: because they've benefited their society more, because they have equal rights as any other, or because of an actual merit.
3) "Is a market allocation of 100 cabs worse than a random allocation of 0 cabs?"
Yes, because the latter case doesn't promote inequality, further privileging those that already have money.
This "market allocation of 100 cabs" doesn't help at all anybody without the necessary cutoff amount. So essentially your question is: is it better to have a service cattering to just the top 100 richer people of a city, or to not have it at all.
If it was something inconsequential, like manicure, that would may be OK.
Something like cab service OTOH puts poor oeople in a further disadvantage. E.g. going to a job interview, one of the rich cab riders can get faster and more relaxed than the poor public transport/walking guy.
Also not having access to a cab might even give a motive to those 100 with more money and power to fix public transport to be better.
1) But access is not equal. Some people get a cab, others don't.
2) Does this apply to all goods? Are you simply advocating communism here?
3) I'm glad you acknowledge that you'd rather have us all be equally poor than have some be richer than others. This is probably another reason we disagree - I don't view other people having more than me as an intrinsically bad thing.
I guess the difference between our moral axioms is clear. I prefer the US model - high inequality but everyone is rich. You seem to prefer the India model - dire poverty but virtually everyone is equally poor.
This is apparently why we disagree. Good to know it's due simply to different moral axioms rather than some error in reasoning.
1) Yes. But a random distribution benefits the population in a non-discriminating pattern, instead of re-encorcing the rule of the richer.
2) Why, is there a problem with that? First of, all communism is not necessarily stalinist communism the kind that prevailed in the 20th century. In fact such "communal" ideas go millenia before even Marx.
Second, a society with renewable power, advanced automation, and they kind of resources we have, or will soon have, will inevitably need some form of "communism". Most sci-fi depictions of society, even Star Trek at times, are quite near that.
>I guess the difference between our moral axioms is clear. I prefer the US model - high inequality but everyone is rich. You seem to prefer the India model - dire poverty but virtually everyone is equally poor.
Actually India follows more or less the US model -- they just are behind, as a developing country. There are super rich, a middle class (increasing) and super poor.
And if you think that in the US there's "high inequality but everyone is rich" you've probably never set foot outside of a middle class/upper middle class echo chamber. From SD, MS, NM, AZ, AL, to the thousands of homeless in NY, Chicago, SF, etc, the trailer poor, the ghettos, etc. That's not some outliers.
As for me, I prefer the model of the US in the 50s and 60s. Less super-rich, everybody can make a living, less super poor, much decreased inequality and more protections. And I don't mind having "socialist" niceties like cheap education (like college tuition used to be), municipal fiber and wifi, and such.
Large parts of the US are like backwaters when it comes to health, quality of life, public transport, internet acccess speeds and such things compared to some Western European countries.
The US is extremely rich. We have close to 100% penetration of flush toilets, clean water, 24/7 power, etc. 75% of our (relative) "poor" have a car, 70% live in a house with 2 rooms/person, and 45% own that home. In most of the world the word for that is "rich".
Compare to overall numbers in India, or if you can find them, to various communist nations.
Hopefully India will get to the US model, they are certainly taking many positive steps. I'm bullish. But they aren't remotely there yet. Basically the entire country lives in what would be called deep extreme poverty (e.g. probably the bottom 1%) in the US.
I also wouldn't want to go back to the poverty of the US 50's and 60's. I think everyone deserves a flush toilet (as in our modern "some people are richer than others" world), not just the top 80-90% (back when we were more "equal").
Denmark is more equal than the US yet you wouldn't call anyone there poor in fact they are one of the richest countries in the world alongside with both Sweden and Norway.
Again the problem as with the article we are debating starts when you try to isolate the argument by creating your own control groups.
So then your actual objection is that Uber is charging money at all. After all there are many people who can't afford the non-surge rates which is also unfair, right?
Preventing market participants from overtly bidding with money doesn't make the competition for access magically go away. Resources are going to be allocated, and it's sure not going to happen "randomly".
For services such as taxis or health care, the currency merely shifts to personal clout and time.
From the perspective of those who can afford surge pricing this is an improvement not for those who cant.
Those who can't afford it are at the same position, their status hasn't changed. Without it, nobody can use the taxis, with it, rich can use taxis, non-rich still can't. Surge pricing is strictly an improvement.
Another example: I provide food for a standard price. That price is determined by the weather. I can't control the weather, so I can't control the price. If the weather is poor, it affects production, the price goes up. I still guarantee to provide the food, yet less people can afford it. It would be strictly worse to stop production of food in case of poor weather.
You incorrectly assume the same number of drivers in both modes. With surge pricing there are more drivers, therefore more people get the drive, making it strictly better.
Chance plays no role here. It is a red-herring you invented and you can't see past it.
Let me simplify it for you with a realistic example: Without surge pricing, nobody gets to drive, because the weather is so poor. With surge pricing some daring drivers will take some passengers. Strict improvement, because some people got to drive. without: p == 0 with: p > 0
What is the primary difference here? People drove. It surge pricing moral in this case? Yes, because the number of drivers on the road increased compared to non-surge pricing.
You are missing the point. First group everyone had a chance, second group only those who can afford it has one. So someone IS worse of because of surge pricing exactly because now they have no chance. It doesent help anything that of those who can afford it there are more cars. Thats what it means to make an ethical argument. Cherry picking your control group isnt.
The general rule about "improving things a little is better than doing nothing" would philosophically require you to take a much broader view of the improvements you think you do and see if they affect other things causally. If you do that you quickly run into problems and things become much more complex. Yet thats what you do when you look at ethics.
For instance:
"Now instead of having no taxis at all, people can choose between an expensive taxi or no taxi at all – a marginal improvement. Needless to say, Uber has been repeatedly lambasted for doing something instead of leaving the even-worse status quo the way it was."
From the perspective of those who can afford surge pricing this is an improvement not for those who cant.
Uber is planning on making cars automated, thats great for the consumer but not for those driver who suddenly find themselves out of jobs. People who helped pay for ubers automation of their fleet.
The more correct "interpretation" is to not call it ethical or non-ethical. It's both correct and not correct.
In other words from an ethical point of view and to stay in the quantum theoretical jargon — it's not been observed.