Why don't you pay for her maternity leave and such? Near as I can tell, you, me and Markhor are all in the same moral boat - none of us are paying for this hypothetical woman to sit at home enjoying pregnancy.
You and I have simply never touched or interacted with her, so according to the Copenhagen theory of ethics we get a moral pass.
People downvote you for being direct, but you show you exactly know what the article is about, and coldtea should read the article again.
My perspective: Markhor should follow whatever ethics appeals to their donators, as to maximize their revenue. If that indirectly causes women to be exploited, that's a shame and we should all write terrible articles about it, but until the general consensus changes that's just what they have to do.
>Why don't you pay for her maternity leave and such?
Because I'm not making money off of her.
>Near as I can tell, you, me and Markhor are all in the same moral boat - none of us are paying for this hypothetical woman to sit at home enjoying pregnancy.
Only, one of us has used the $x an hour work of that woman up to that point, to make $xxx products that they sell.
>Ok, you are pretty explicitly appealing to the Copenhagen theory of ethics. Good to have that out in the open.
I don't appeal to any such BS. The so called "Copenhagen theory of ethics" is an ill-thought neologism of the writer of the blog post, and lacks several metric tons of nuances and considerations.
The basic premise -- that a third-party has the same "moral obligation" to pay her maternity leave as the person who employeed her, made money of her (the total balanace was positive on THEIR side, not hers) and fired her when she become pregnant, is absurd.
Not only that, but protections against firing an employee that became pregnant are an accepted part of the legal and moral obligations of an employee, enforced by law in most developed countries.
If anything the burden of proof is on the author of TFA to counter the thinking of all those legislators.
I would also like to know how a deal like "I'll give you food everyday for having sex with you" to a poor woman who hates the idea, but is starving and thus accepts it, is any different than the situations lauded by the author of TFA article.
After all the woman is better off, right? She would be starving or even dead from hunger. And she accepted the deal by her own volition.
"The Copenhagen Interpretation of Ethics says that when you observe or interact with a problem in any way, you can be blamed for it. At the very least, you are to blame for not doing more."
To summarize your post: I subscribe to the Copenhagen interpretation of ethics, but don't call it that!
I have no moral objection to prostitution. I also have no moral objection to "I'll give you money everyday for cleaning my house" to a poor person who hates cleaning.
>I have no moral objection to prostitution. I also have no moral objection to "I'll give you money everyday for cleaning my house" to a poor person who hates cleaning.
Do you have moral objections to anything, then, or do you think that as the necessary money have been exchanged everything is OK?
Also do you think that "voluntary agreement" means the same for everybody in every financial situation?
Your attitudes are common and somewhat align with the way things work today, but I think everyone would be better off if society viewed the market as just an efficient medium for exchange and took more direct responsibility for the welfare of the poor rather than foisting those responsibilities on arbitrary economic transactions. The market already has a mechanism in place to determine price by balancing supply and demand. Markets have problems, like big players and lack of information, but this basic price determination mechanism is great when it works.
Also, I think it's best to pick a different example than prostitution because of the importance of cultural factors there. Instead, what if I offer $20 to a poor person to let me slap them hard in the face? That might be a good deal for them, but I'm still a jerk for doing it. The problem though isn't that the transaction is exploitative. It's that it's wasteful. Why did the poor person need to endure the slap? What was the point?
> rather than foisting those responsibilities on arbitrary economic transactions
Transactions are never arbitrary. They're an action taken by individuals based on their interests, and their interests are determined by their values, and their values are often shaped -- at least to some degree -- by communal values.
> but this basic price determination mechanism is great when it works
How do you know when it works? Obviously, there is difference of opinion in determining what "works" means.
> Instead, what if I offer $20 to a poor person to let me slap them hard in the face? That might be a good deal for them, but I'm still a jerk for doing it. The problem though isn't that the transaction is exploitative. It's that it's wasteful.
> the total balanace was positive on THEIR side, not hers
It was positive on both of their sides. They made money from the fruits of her labor, and she made money from the money that they gave her in exchange.
Employment is positive sum. Just because one party benefits from a transaction, doesn't mean someone else lost out.
"The Copenhagen theory of ethics" isn't a thing. It is an attempt of the author to ridicule a nuanced and rich ethics which he (I can only assume it's a he, but it seems like a safe bet) doesn't understand and doesn't seem to want to understand. Instead of asking why some people react in a way he doesn't understand, he assumes they're idiots and makes fun of them. Any system which is complex enough because it's a result of careful study of a complex system such as our society, can seem absurd to someone who doesn't wish to understand it, and because they can't see the complexity -- for lack of study -- think that their simple (simplistic) approach is superior.
Obviously improving things even a little is better than not improving them at all. People just disagree whether what the author sees as a clear improvement is in fact so -- that's why you and the GP disagree.
Also, a nuanced ethical view may support a an action that improves things while at the same time note (and accept as the lesser evil) an ethical problem with it. No one says that any desired (or "good") action must be ethically perfect. Even moralists know how to compromise sometimes, even though they do so with protest. Seems like a perfectly reasonable thing to me.
> Since I'm more utilitarian and I don't take Copenhagen as my moral axiom
It's very much a thing. Coldtea explicitly said he's not responsible for the pregnant woman "because I'm not making money off of her", implying that if he were to observe/interact with her he would be responsible. Retra did the same thing.
That's by definition the Copenhagen interpretation of ethics.
If you want to make a different argument that does not depend on the Copenhagen interpretation, go for it. The fact that you can make a different argument doesn't mean that others (e.g. coldtea) aren't using Copenhagen.
The author states his definition as "the Copenhagen Interpretation of Ethics says that when you observe or interact with a problem in any way, you can be blamed for it." No one subscribes to that ethics, hence it's not a thing (anywhere outside's the author's distorted view of others, that is).
OTOH, saying that the level of your responsibility for another individual may correlate with the benefit they give you (e.g. you make a profit) seems like a reasonable thing. It seems quite reasonable to believe that our responsibility towards the other may increase if 1/ we somehow contributed to their misfortune, 2/ if we somehow benefit from it, or 3/ if we benefit from them in any way at all. Each of these may of course increase the responsibility by different amounts.
Points 2 and 3 seem like a natural conclusion of the ideal of fairness and reciprocity. Your contribution to the good of others should be commensurate with their contribution to yours.
> Coldtea explicitly said he's not responsible for the pregnant woman "because I'm not making money off of her", implying that if he were to observe/interact with her he would be responsible.
No, that's what you explicitly said when you tried hard to not understand other people's arguments. coldtea said no such thing. coldtea said that they wouldn't pay for the woman's maternity leave, not that their responsibility towards her is nil. coldtea's level of responsibility simply does not reach the point of owing her maternity leave.
Me: "Near as I can tell, you, me and Markhor are all in the same moral boat..."
Coldtea: "Only, one of us [the employer] has used the $x an hour work of that woman up to that point..."
If you want to argue that coldtea isn't making a moral argument as to why he isn't responsible, be my guest. I don't think my interpretation is unreasonable.
It seems quite reasonable to believe that our responsibility towards the other may increase if 1/ we somehow contributed to their misfortune, 2/ if we somehow benefit from it, or 3/ if we benefit from them in any way at all.
(2) and (3) are exactly what the author is calling the Copenhagen Interpretation. I thought this wasn't a thing?
> (2) and (3) are exactly what the author is calling the Copenhagen Interpretation.
That is not the case. Let me state it clearly. He says:
interaction => blame
We say:
profit => increased responsibility
No one blames the interactor for the origin of the problem, nor does anyone demand increased responsibility if the interactor doesn't benefit from the interaction in any way. No one even asks for a level of responsibility that far exceeds the benefit.
The author's view is known as the non-worseness claim, which is often described by those who are more generous towards it as "free floating evil". Those who are less generous, view it in worse ways, of course.
BTW, the criticism of homeless experiment does seem stupid, but I don't know the details. Also, the critic may not have actually made a moral argument (even if he tried to frame it as such). For all I know he's a politician who opposes the mayor and would use any argument at all against him, even if he doesn't really believe it.
If the author means what I mean, then he does a very bad job countering the good arguments in favor of profit => increased responsibility (i.e. against mutually beneficial exploitation), while at the same time he portrays a very important ethical standpoint -- one held by many of those who devote their lives to the study of ethics -- as ridiculous. Why? I suspect that's because he never bothered to read any of the serious discussions on this issue, so he's arguing out of ignorance. I don't think that paints his arguments in any better light.
>Obviously improving things even a little is better than not improving them at all. People just disagree whether what the author sees as a clear improvement is in fact so -- that's why you and the GP disagree.
Not true: in all the examples given, the critics never articlulate a mechanism for how that could be true. I know because I look for this every time such a scenario comes up.
You seem to be making the mistake of thinking that "because a good argument exists, that must be what these critics really mean"; that because there's academic literature on optimal tariffs, that's what's grounding the protectionists who complain about "takin' our jobs". But the people referred to in the post don't articulate how eg Uber surge pricing made things worse, only that "hey they're visible and related to suffering". If and when people cite how Uber surge pricing reduces service, Uber supporters are more than willing to have that discussion!
If the argument only exists in a philosophical article that almost none of the critics have heard of, you can't really say that's driving their critique.
So if some people support good ideas for simplistic reasons why is that such an interesting topic of discussion? I'm sure there are plenty of people who support mutually-beneficial exploitation for stupid reasons, too.
Yet the author chooses to present the situation as a group of people who want nothing other than to make the world a better place, while stupid hordes get in their way. I can assure you that that's not the true state of affairs, either.
Moreover, why is it good to assume that those who disagree with you do so because they're stupid? Maybe they're not, and maybe they accidentally made a good argument. In any case, trying to understand the merits of the arguments would only enrich you. But the author -- who clearly considers himself to be among the smart ones -- never bothers to look up the literature on this very topic (or, at least, he doesn't cite any), namely mutually advantageous exploitation, opting instead to base it on a much simpler philosophical argument, without consideration for the nuanced discussion of this very issue. So we can assume -- as he and you do -- that his position is driven by nothing more than simplistic arguments.
Whether any particular person makes a naive argument depends on the details of that argument, so I'm not going to delve into that further without a specific example.
I want to defend the general point though, that "If people are making a general class of error in some context, then that class should be pointed out, even if not everyone in that context makes that error." You're right: some people do go far enough to (dubiously) make a case about how eg surge pricing reduces availability. These arguments are the exception, not the norm, and people should be made aware of the more general, mistaken point.
And for what it's worth, I most certainly do try to find these "they're making it strictly worse than had they not intervened" arguments, but the popular expositions never make them. The fact that "oh, someone else makes arguments somewhere that aren't crappy" is no defense, and it does not improve the debate to let bad arguments linger because you prefer they be equated with better ones (which really just confuses things). If someone makes an error, that error should be corrected, whether or not there's an argument for the same conclusion that doesn't.
You really don't have to go far to find a protectionist argument that's 100% "dey took are jerbs" and 0% "this is not the optimal tariff defined in the literature."
> I most certainly do try to find these "they're making it strictly worse than had they not intervened" arguments, but the popular expositions never make them
But the author is not making any good arguments in favor of mutually advantageous exploitation either, and there are good ones. He is also guilty of making naive arguments! This very topic has been debated at length by philosophers. Why reduce it to ridiculing the other side while not showing any clear, educated thought on the author's part, either?
> You really don't have to go far to find a protectionist argument that's 100% "dey took are jerbs"
And you really don't have to go far to find arguments like, "we're da job craters!" and "we're making the world a better place, woooo!" (which is the level of arguments the author is making)
I think the problem author wanted to highlight, which seems to be missed in this subthread, is that CIE is not "doing little is OK too", but that unless you commit all your resources to do everything you can to help, you'll likely to be seen doing too little and become hated. This forms a chilling effect that makes people with opportunity to do something chose to ignore it, in order not to interact with the problem.
Oh, I understand what he's saying, it's just that what he's saying is a distorted view of reality. It is not true that "unless you commit all your resources to do everything you can to help, you'll likely to be seen doing too little and become hated", and if he thinks that that's why people criticise those actions then he misses something very important.
People are saying that mutually advantageous exploitation is at least problematic and requires more thoughtfulness. Some, of course, may disagree, but this is a long-standing and interesting debate among philosophers. So, instead of feeling self-righteously and victimised he should 1/ examine reality more closely because perhaps things are not as they appear to him, and 2/ try to understand some of the good arguments against MAE.
>Obviously improving things even a little is better than not improving them at all.
That is not at all obvious. It's particularly not obvious when you benefit from the marginal improvement, thereby creating a damn good reason to not improve the problem any more than marginally.
Right, but I would call a claimed improvement that actively blocks bigger improvements a non-improvement or even harm. I think we're in perfect agreement.
Forgive the question, but I'm trying to understand. How is the position you're defending different from "All people are equally responsible for all things"?
For example, let's say that my live-in boyfriend confesses to me that he's been sleeping with another man. He has, essentially, no other home. Do all of the following people bear equal responsibility to take him in: me, the man with whom he has been sleeping, and you? Based on your comment, are we all in the same moral boat – none of us are paying to take him in?
(Unrelatedly, the phrase "sit at home enjoying pregnancy" may not communicate what you wanted to communicate.)
My position is that contact with a situation doesn't make you more obligated to assist than someone who had no contact. The details of your obligation, or the second boyfriend's obligation, are entirely based on your mutual agreements and understandings.
The really weird thing about the Copenhagen Interpretation is that it imposes an "uncanny valley" of moral virtue. If I ignore a situation and provide 0 help, I'm virtuous. If I help to the tune of K or more, I'm virtuous. But if I provide 0 < R < K help, I'm suddenly a villain. This is just a really weird idea and I can't see any reasonable justification for it.
> […] contact with a situation doesn't make you more obligated to assist than someone who had no contact.
This sounds like an answer of all three mentioned people having equal obligation. That is, the second boyfriend could ethically claim, "I have no obligation to take you in – after all, literally anyone else with equal capability could do it instead."
If I understand this correctly, then thank you for the clarification.
That's not quite my view. If the "second boyfriend" relationship is one that normally comes with obligations like taking someone in temporarily, then that second boyfriend is more obligated than other parties. If the other guy is just a NSA hookup, then he's definitely not obligated - such a relationship establishes no such obligation.
(I'm not very familiar with the "second boyfriend" relationship, having never actually taken on that role.)
Because this woman is working for you, in the same way that you don't fire an employee who dared to get sick. If your business model means that you can't afford to treat your employees decently, maybe you need a new business model.
You and I have simply never touched or interacted with her, so according to the Copenhagen theory of ethics we get a moral pass.