1) Isn’t part of the founding sources I mentioned. It was quite controversial at the time.
2) Stands for exactly the opposite of what you’re arguing. Marbury goes to great lengths to disclaim any authority over executive policymaking and discretion, and limit courts to compelling executive officers to act only when the duties are specifically assigned by law and ministerial:
> This is not a proceeding which may be varied if the judgment of the Executive shall suggest one more eligible, but is a precise course accurately marked out by law, and is to be strictly pursued. It is the duty of the Secretary of State to conform to the law, and in this he is an officer of the United States, bound to obey the laws. He acts, in this respect, as has been very properly stated at the bar, under the authority of law, and not by the instructions of the President. It is a ministerial act which the law enjoins on a particular officer for a particular purpose.
And even after determining that delivery of the already executed commission is a ministerial act, the Court went out of its way to invoke a jurisdictional escape hatch to avoid actually enjoining an executive officer. A fair application of Marbury would preclude the sweeping powers courts have asserted to micromanage executive action in response to private litigation.
In Marbury, the court ruled that Marbury had already been appointed when the previous president signed his commission, and the only thing that remained was the purely ministerial act of the secretary of state delivering the signed letter that was sitting in the president’s desk. But even then, the Court found a way to avoid compelling the secretary of state to actually deliver the commission! How would the Marbury court view the prospect of a district court ordering the president to turn around military planes being used to deport an admitted El Salvadoran citizen? Or district courts ordering the President to reach out to a foreign country’s president to demand the return of that foreign country’s citizen! The Marbury court wouldn’t have dreamed of it!
What Marbury stands for is that the judicial branch can declare the legality of laws and executive actions, but should bend over backwards to avoid actually compelling the executive to perform any action.
1) Isn’t part of the founding sources I mentioned. It was quite controversial at the time.
2) Stands for exactly the opposite of what you’re arguing. Marbury goes to great lengths to disclaim any authority over executive policymaking and discretion, and limit courts to compelling executive officers to act only when the duties are specifically assigned by law and ministerial:
> This is not a proceeding which may be varied if the judgment of the Executive shall suggest one more eligible, but is a precise course accurately marked out by law, and is to be strictly pursued. It is the duty of the Secretary of State to conform to the law, and in this he is an officer of the United States, bound to obey the laws. He acts, in this respect, as has been very properly stated at the bar, under the authority of law, and not by the instructions of the President. It is a ministerial act which the law enjoins on a particular officer for a particular purpose.
And even after determining that delivery of the already executed commission is a ministerial act, the Court went out of its way to invoke a jurisdictional escape hatch to avoid actually enjoining an executive officer. A fair application of Marbury would preclude the sweeping powers courts have asserted to micromanage executive action in response to private litigation.
In Marbury, the court ruled that Marbury had already been appointed when the previous president signed his commission, and the only thing that remained was the purely ministerial act of the secretary of state delivering the signed letter that was sitting in the president’s desk. But even then, the Court found a way to avoid compelling the secretary of state to actually deliver the commission! How would the Marbury court view the prospect of a district court ordering the president to turn around military planes being used to deport an admitted El Salvadoran citizen? Or district courts ordering the President to reach out to a foreign country’s president to demand the return of that foreign country’s citizen! The Marbury court wouldn’t have dreamed of it!
What Marbury stands for is that the judicial branch can declare the legality of laws and executive actions, but should bend over backwards to avoid actually compelling the executive to perform any action.