> the argument for climate change is based on statistical likelihood of existing trends continuing based on past measurement. <
That can easily be generalized to any scientific construct, since all predictions and theories based on experiment implicitly contain the assumption of their continued validity. Consequently what you're doing is conflating an argument against the metaphysical underpinnings of science (amusingly, by arguing from the assumptions of rationalism which are themselves subject to at least as much skepticism and scrutiny) with an argument against the products of scientific discovery.
No it can't. You'll find exact sciences don't work like this.
First in maths you have models. Of course some models match reality and some don't, but proven "given" a model means a very specific thing and is extremely rigorous.
Second physics, at least particle physics, has a lot of models these days. The most famous "in use" one is the standard model. It is not based on measurement, but on the assumption that a specific geometric shape determines the laws of physics, along with a number of constants, none of which can be directly measured (and generally, you don't use the "real" ones for calculation because they're somewhat inconvenient). The conclusions of the standard model are valid given those assumptions, just like mathematical theories are. That has good sides and really bad ones. The good, everybody knows. The worst: according to the standard model, gravity shouldn't exist.
You'll find most rigorous theories of exact sciences work like that. We can give a very, very thorough argument why electrical current and magnetism work in perpendicular planes, give exact values for the magnitudes, and you will not find a single measured quantity anywhere in that argument with one exception : the one that determines the units used. But that is an arbitrary constant, different for the metric versus imperial system.
Now I'm not saying there aren't variations on what it means to be proven within these sciences, but you can reasonably say that given the peano axioms and the model used, these conclusions are proven.
No such claim can be made for climate science. The "laws" of climate science are not the result of first principles (because they don't match observed behavior of the atmosphere), but statistical best estimators of observed measurements. This is absolutely not the same standard as used in exact sciences.
> The "laws" of climate science are not the result of first principles (because they don't match observed behavior of the atmosphere), but statistical best estimators of observed measurements. <
I didn't read the comment I replied to this way; my mistake. By the way, I understand how exact sciences work (I chose astrophysics and relativity for my specializations in physics), but thanks for the exposition.
That can easily be generalized to any scientific construct, since all predictions and theories based on experiment implicitly contain the assumption of their continued validity. Consequently what you're doing is conflating an argument against the metaphysical underpinnings of science (amusingly, by arguing from the assumptions of rationalism which are themselves subject to at least as much skepticism and scrutiny) with an argument against the products of scientific discovery.